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Abstract—Reconciliation is a mechanism allowing to weed out
the discrepancies between two correlated variables. It has great
role in every Quantum Key Distribution protocol where the key
has to be transmitted through a noisy channel or as in our
case of study in presence of an eavesdropping. In this paper,
we show that for discrete-variable QKD protocols, this problem
can be advantageously solved with Turbo codes. In particular, we
demonstrate that our method leads to a significant improvement
of Bit Error Rate, may divide it by three in presence of a
eavesdropper even with great eavesdropping capability.
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum Key Distribution achieves a secret random string
namely the key known only to the two parties who are execut-
ing the protocol. The first protocol for quantum cryptography
was proposed in 1984 by Bennett of IBM and Brassard of the
University of Montreal and it is called the BB84 protocol [1].
Protocol BB84 like any other protocol of quantum cryptogra-
phy is based on two principal phases: a quantum phase via a
one-way physical quantum channel and a public phase using
an authenticated two-way classic ideal channel.
As categorized in [7], a QKD protocol can usually be divided
into four steps that will be illustrated below.
1) Quantum transmission and reception: In order to well
explain this step, we use the language of spin 12 as
the first experimental demonstration of the protocol in
1991 used the polarization states of single photons to
transmit a random key. The protocol uses four quantum
states that constitute two bases. A basis is chosen to
distinguish the two values 0 and 1 without ambiguity.
One choice is the rectilinear basis
⊕
where photons are
polarized at angle 0◦ (↔) or 90◦ (l) representing 0 and
1 respectively. Another choice is the diagonal basis
⊗
where 0 is represented by photons polarized at 45◦ (↗)
and 1 by photons polarized at 135◦ (↖).
First, Alice sends quantum states chosen at random
among the four states to Bob on the quantum channel.
Quantum states could be sent all at once or for practical
reasons one after the other with one restriction on
the ability of establishing a one-to-one correspondence
between the transmitted and the received. Next, Bob
measures these incoming states in one of the two bases,
chosen at random by using an independent random-
number generator from that of Alice. On receiving the
state, Bob informs Alice via public channels of the
basis used to accept each bit. After that, Alice informs
Bob, which bits were applied the correct basis. At this
point, whenever they use the same basis, they have a
great probability to have correlated results. However,
whenever they use different bases, they get uncorrelated
results. So, they discard the incorrect ones and use the
remaining.
Fig. 1. Steps of BB84 protocol [2].
This process gives the two parties correlated random
variables, called sifted key XA and XB (Fig. 1).
2) Channel parameter estimation: In this step, Alice and
Bob estimate the channel parameters between them
from announced data, in particular the joint probability
distribution among Alice, Bob and Eve.
3) Information reconciliation: Theoretically uncondition-
ally secure because it is based on the quantum laws
of physics, rather than the assumed computational com-
plexity of mathematical problems [2], BB84 protocol
performance can be reduced by a various errors and
information leakage such as limited intrinsic efficiency
of the protocol, imperfect devices and eavesdropping.
This step aims to improve BB84 performances by con-
versation over the public channel.
4) Privacy amplification: Alice and Bob shorten their bits.
The resulting bits are almost statistically independent of
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all the information possessed by Eve.
In our work, we are interested in correcting errors in the
sifted keys. It appears clearly that reconciliation should be per-
formed.The construction of an efficient reconciliation scheme
and its validation by testing its performance are a difficult
problem. Recently, Turbo codes have shown to be good
candidates for this reconciliation application [3].
This manuscript is organized as follows: In Section 2, we
present an overview of previous related works. In Section 3,
we introduce the basic knowledge of Turbo codes. In Section
4, we describe our proposed reconciliation method. In section
5, we simulate the efficiency and the correcting ability of
our method and give some results. Some conclusions and
perspectives are consequently drawn in the sixth section.
II. PREVIOUS WORKS
Several methods of error reconciliation for quantum cryp-
tography have already been reported in the literature. In
what follows, we will only concentrate on the most widely
used ones: the best known Cascade algorithm [4], the Binary
algorithm [5], the Winnow algorithm [6], and the Low-Density
Parity-Check code LDPC [8].
In 1992, Bennett et al. [5] proposed a simple and easy rec-
onciliation method called Binary. In 1993, Brassard et al. [4]
proposed a stronger ability of error correction method called
Cascade. Cascade and Binary remove a single error and don’t
introduce additional errors to multiple errors block, instead
of the Winnow, introduced by Buttler et al. [6], algorithm
because the Hamming algorithm only reveals one single error
in each block. Cascade is an efficient method of reconciliation
but its main handicap is the time of communication that it is
proportional to the length of the key while for the winnow
algorithm, communication time only depends on the error rate.
Recently, the LDPC codes have shown the ability to correct
the same range of errors as Cascade and has the advantage to
improve the safety of the used protocol. This has motivated our
approach to study Turbo codes which were proven to perform
better when compared with LDPC in the literature.
In the context of continuous variables, modern coding tech-
niques have been used such as Turbo codes in [9] and LDPC
codes in [10] and [11]. In contrast with continous variable
information reconciliation, not much has been done to adapt
modern coding techniques to the discrete case. Here, it should
be noted that forward error correction has the advantage of
being very well known and even attaining the Shannon limit
for some channels. This shows again that reconciliation can
be advantageously solved with Turbo codes. We will describe
it in more details in the next section.
III. AN OVERVIEW OF TURBO CODES
We start with a presentation of the Turbo code theoretical
tool. Turbo coding was first introduced in 1993 by Berrou
and al. [12]. The codes are constructed by using two or more
component codes on different interleaved versions of the same
information sequence. The constituent codes are usually two
identical recursive systematic convolutional codes (see Fig. 2).
Fig. 2. The generic Turbo encoder.
The input sequence to be encoded is divided into blocks
of length N . Each block is encoded by the first encoder
and interleaved before passing through the second encoder.
Researchers have proved that Turbo codes can approach the
Shannon limit closer than any other known forward error
correcting code. The efficiency of the Turbo codes is due to the
use of an iterative process at the decoder side and the presence
of an interleaver at the encoder side, which adds randomness-
like effect to the code.
The turbo decoder consists of two, or more, Soft-In Soft-Out
(SISO) maximum likelihood decoders (see Fig. 3).
Fig. 3. The generic Turbo decoder.
For conventional codes, the final step at the decoder yields
hard-decision decoded bits or decoded symbols. Whereas,
for a concatenated scheme as its the case of Turbo code,
the decoding algorithm don’t pass hard decisions among the
decoders. But, to best exploit the information learned from
each decoder, the decoding algorithm effects an exchange of
soft decisions. Decoders are operating in parallel, exchanging
iteratively extrinsic information. In other words, for a system
with two component codes, the concept behind Turbo decoding
is to pass soft decisions from the output of one decoder to the
input of the other decoder, and to iterate this process several
times so as to produce more reliable decisions.
Two families of decoding algorithms are commonly used
in Turbo decoding: Soft Output Viterbi Algorithms (SOVA)
and Maximum A Posteriori (MAP) algorithms. The MAP
algorithm is more efficient but more complex than the SOVA.
However, simplified versions of this algorithm such as MAX-
Log-MAP and Log-MAP perform almost as well with a
reduced complexity.
IV. PROPOSED KEY RECONCILIATION SCHEME
In our work, we propose to resort to Turbo codes to
accomplish reconciliation, more precisely the analysis model
is shown in Fig. 4. Alice and Bob communicate with BB84
protocol and Eve uses intercept and resend attack. The data
sample generated by Alice is firstly encoded and then decoded
in the Bob’s side.
Fig. 4. Proposed key reconciliation scheme.
In what follows, we will only operate on binary variables,
which are applied to discrete variable Quantum Key Distribu-
tion. Let XA and XB be two of correlated variables belonging
to Alice and Bob commonly called sifted keys. Reconciliation
is a mechanism that allows them to eliminate the discrepancies
between XA an XB and agree upon a string XˆA. Thus, the
problem can be seen as a source coding problem with side
information (see Fig. 5) [13].
Fig. 5. Source coding model with side information.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
In this section, we discuss the experimental performances of
our reconciliation method. We have implemented a Quantum
Key Distribution protocol as described in [1]. Also, we have
implemented and experimented our reconciliation method on
the case of one special type of eavesdropping strategy: Inter-
cept and Resend.
Intercept and Resend is the most known eavesdropping indi-
vidual strategy that can be implemented with actual technology
means. As described by Fig. 6, Intercept and Resend attack is
where Eve measures the quantum states sent by Alice. Then,
she pretends as Alice and sends replacement states to Bob
corresponding to her measurement result prepared in a chosen
base from the two possible bases. This produces errors in the
key Alice and Bob share. As Eve has no knowledge of the
basis a state sent by Alice is encoded in, she can only guess
which basis to measure in, in the same way as Bob. If she
chooses correctly, she measures the correct photon polarization
state as sent by Alice, and resents the correct state to Bob.
However, if she chooses incorrectly the base, the state sent to
Bob can’t be the same as the one sent by Alice. Then, even if
Bob measures this state in the Alice’s basis, he gets a random
result because Eve has sent him a state in the opposite basis.
Fig. 6. Intercept and Resend attack (s=1).
We define for this eavesdropping strategy the probability s
that one qubit sent by Alice to Bob is eavesdropped. The
performance of the reconciliation method can be evaluated
by measuring the Bit Error Rate and comparing it to the one
generated by the Intercept and Resend attack given by [3]:
BER =
s
4
.
It can be noted that Bit Error Rate (BER) decreases up to
0 as the parameter of eavesdropping attack s decreases also to
0. This means that when Eve has a little access to Alice states,
Alice and Bob will have the same sifted keys because we have
made the assumption that the channel is perfect. And, as the
eavesdropper capability to catch Alice’s states increases, we
have an increasing Bit Error Rate as shown in Fig. 7.
Fig. 7. Bit Error Rate as function of s-values for Intercept and Resend
eavesdropping.
In Fig. 7, the effect of the eavesdropping attack and the
performance of our reconciliation method are also examined.
The Bit Error Rate of the BB84 protocol decoupling with
Turbo coding reconciliation scheme with 1 and 18 iterations
is shown for different values of the eavesdropper parameter s.
BB84 protocol BB84 protocol with our reconciliation method
s = 0.1 3.08% 2.5%
s = 0.8 16.92% 6.3%
TABLE I
EXAMPLES OF BIT ERROR RATE FOR INTERCEPT AND RESEND ATTACK
ON BB84 PROTOCOL.
As a reference, we also show the theoretical and simulated Bit
Error Rate without application of the reconciliation method.
Looking at the value of the parameter s equal to 0.1, we
see that the achieved Bit Error Rate amounts to 3.08% for
simulated BB84 protocol and decreases to 2.5% thanks to
the reconciliation, which means that it was devised by 1.23.
The gain increases when the eavesdropper capability increases.
Indeed, the achieved Bit Error Rate after reconciliation is
6.3% for s equal to 0.8 and 16.92% given by simulation of
BB84 protocol without reconciliation, which means that it was
devised by 5.12.
To sum up, we can mention that we have proven by
simulation the efficiency of our reconciliation method as the
average of initial Bit Error Rate equal to 13.11% decreases to
4.17% after reconciliation. Thus, our reconciliation method
succeeds in removing on average of 68.19% of the errors
caused by eavesdropping. One should note that the maximum
Bit Error Rate admissible to distribute a secret is 11% which
is obtained with our method of reconciliation even with a total
eavesdropping capability (s = 1).
As it appears in Fig. 8, the advantage of our reconciliation
method can also be well seen in logarithmic presentation.
Fig. 8. Bit Error Rate as function of s-values for Intercept and Resend
eavesdropping in logarithmic domain .
Two other criteria that one should keep in mind when evalu-
ating a reconciliation method: its complexity and its rapidity.
This last criterium is especially relevant in the case of highly
interactive schemes where latency can become an issue. We
can say that the integration of our method of reconciliation
doesn’t affect so much the simulation time of the BB84
protocol. Just to have some order of magnitude, we give the
BB84 protocol time of running which is about 0.076s and the
reconciliation method demands 0.023s.
Finally, we can see that at high value of the parameter s,
the difference of BER gain resulting from an application of
Turbo code with one and with 18 iterations is relatively small.
So, it would be better to stop Turbo coding after few iterations
since it doesn’t affect the results and the number of iterations
is of concern because every iteration reveals information and
consumes times with each communication between Alice and
Bob.
VI. CONCLUSION
The BB84 protocol allows remote parties to share secret
keys. But, the keys generated by this protocol will contain
some errors which are caused by technical imperfections, as
well as possibly by Eve’s intervention. Such a situation, that
the legitimate partners must remove the errors by public dis-
cussion called reconciliation. In this work, we suggest a way
to improve the efficiency of the BB84 protocol by Turbo code
reconciliation. We have shown that decoupling reconciliation
and eavesdropping analysis in discreet variable quantum key
protocol by using Turbo codes allow remarkable improvement
in the Bit Error Rate. There are many related works that are
worth further investigation. We can generalize our research by
taking into consideration not only eavesdropping effect, but
also channel noise and other unwanted interactions in quantum
computation and communication.
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